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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Your amici curiae are the Honorable Judith Fitzgerald (Bankruptcy Judge, Western District of Pennsylvania, ret.), and law Professors Pamela Foohey
(Cardozo School of Law), George Kuney (University of
Tennessee College of Law), Robert Lawless (University
of Illinois College of Law), Jonathan Lipson (Temple
University), Bruce A. Markell (Northwestern Pritzker
School of Law, and Bankruptcy Judge, District of Nevada, ret.), Nancy B. Rapoport (William S. Boyd School
of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas), Richard
Squire (Fordham Law School), Ray Warner (St. John’s
University School of Law), and Jack Williams (Georgia
State University).1
Your amici have taught courses on bankruptcy
and commercial law, conducted research, and have
been frequent speakers and lecturers at seminars and
conferences throughout the United States. Each is
highly regarded in this field, and each has made substantial contributions to bankruptcy scholarship and
jurisprudence.
The question presented to this Court is as follows:
“Whether Bankruptcy Code Section 363(m) limits the
appellate court’s jurisdiction over any sale order or
order deemed integral to a sale order. . . .” (emphasis
1

Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.3(a), the Petitioner and
Respondents have consented to the filing of amicus briefs. Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici affirm that no counsel for a party authored
this brief in whole or in part, and that no person other than amici
or their counsel contributed any money to fund its preparation or
submission.

2
added).2 Pet. i. The answer is that § 363(m) does not
limit appellate review of the transaction involved in
this case—the assignment of a commercial lease to a
new tenant by a bankruptcy debtor. The assignment of
commercial leases is governed exclusively by 11 U.S.C.
§ 365.
The appeal in this case was from an order concerning the assignment of a retail lease in the Mall of
America (the “Assignment Order”).3 The Assignment
Order was entered pursuant to Code § 365 which is the
exclusive Code section that governs the assumption
and assignment of commercial leases. It is a standalone provision with its own specific requirements, and
it operates independently of anything in § 363. Section
365(b) contains no mootness provision,4 and appellate review of orders under § 365(b) is not limited by
§ 363(m).5
Section 365(b) mandates that if a debtor-tenant in
a commercial shopping center assigns its lease as part
of a bankruptcy transaction, the landlord (such as a
2

References to the “Code” are 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. Section
363(m) is located at App. 128a.
3
App. 2a. Order dated September 5, 2019.
4
The term “mootness provision” in this brief is used for convenience only and does not signify any agreement that § 363(m)
is actually a “mootness” section. In re Energy Future Holdings
Corp., 949 F.3d 806 (3d Cir. 2020) describing this phrase as a
“misnomer.”
5
The text of § 365 is set forth in Pet. App. G, 135a-149a. All
references to “App.” refer to Petitioner’s Appendix filed with its
Petition for Certiorari.

3
mall owner) must receive what the Bankruptcy Code
calls “adequate assurance of future performance.”
This statutory protection was deemed critical to mall
owners when Congress adopted the Shopping Center
Amendments in 1984.6 These statutory provisions
have been recognized as vital in protecting mall owners from serious harm when retail tenants within a
shopping center file for bankruptcy.7
In this case, the District Court made detailed findings laying out why the proposed assignment of a lease
by Sears Holding Corp. (“Sears”) to Transform Leaseco
LLC (“Leaseco”) (a subsidiary of Transform Holdings
LLC) failed to satisfy the statutory standard of adequate assurances of future performance to MOAC Mall

6

The “Shopping Center Amendments” to the Bankruptcy
Code were enacted in 1984 as part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333 (1984). “Shopping center landlords, even more than
other non-debtor parties to executory contracts and unexpired
leases, receive ‘extraordinary protection’ under the Code . . .
Section 365(b)(3) however, imposes a heightened standard for
‘adequate assurance of future performance’ in shopping center
leases.” In re Rickel Home Centers, Inc., 209 F.3d 291 (3d Cir.
2000).
7
Lease assignments can result in defaults under an owner’s
mortgage loan, as well as among other occupancy tenants who
have lease provisions guarantying certain tenant mixes. See generally Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1983, Report
from the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 98-65 at 33-35
(1983) (quoting hearings on S. 2297 before the Subcommittee on
Courts of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 97th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1982) (Testimony by Nathan B. Feinstein).

4
Holdings LLC (“MOAC”)—the owner of the Mall of
America.
Two key issues surfaced: whether the assignment would impair the “tenant mix” at the mall, and
whether the proposed assignee could satisfy the test
that its financial condition be similar to that of the
original tenant when it first signed its lease. See
§ 365(b)(3)(A). Both tenant mix and the tenants’ creditworthiness are critical underwriting standards that
lenders evaluate when providing financing for mall
owners.8 This is because a mall’s value and economic
viability depend heavily on tenant mix and tenant creditworthiness. Congress addressed both issues when
it amended § 365(b) by passing the Shopping Center
Amendments.9
However, on rehearing, the District Court dismissed the appeal as moot. It did so by appending to
§ 365(b) a mootness provision found in § 363(m), which
deals with sales of estate property. However, it cited
no authority for the view that Congress intended to
8

For example, tenant mix and tenant credit quality are key
factors that Moody’s Investors Service evaluates in its rating
methodology for commercial real estate property when evaluating collateral for commercial mortgage-backed securities. See
Moody’s Sustainable Net Cash Flow and Value for CMBS and
CRE CLO’s Methodology, November 19, 2021, available at
https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?
docid=PBC_1302944.
9
Congress recognized that a mall is like an ecosystem, with
a high degree of interdependence among the tenants. See John T.
Brooks, Shopping Center Tenants in Bankruptcy: The Effect of the
1984 Code Amendments, 1988 U. Ill. L. Rev. 725.
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permit courts to append a mootness provision from
§ 363 to the highly specific requirements found in
§ 365(b). Instead of looking to the text of § 365(b), it
created a judge-made rule that appended mootness
when a lease assignment was somehow “integral” or
“intertwined” with a prior sale. The court’s reasoning
rests on federal common-lawmaking that did not survive Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
In addition, our interest in filing this brief is to address the serious harm the ruling by the Second Circuit will cause, as it will substantially impair the
rights of mall owners which Congress has carefully detailed in § 365(b). This case well illustrates the harm:
the District Court held that the errant ruling by the
Bankruptcy Court effectively “rewrote” the Bankruptcy Code, and yet found itself powerless to correct
the harm. Unrestricted assignment of leases in a shopping center can cause a host of financial issues, including cross-defaults in mortgage loans and tenant leases,
and downgrading of securities that are collateralized
by mall properties.10
We write to address a larger issue as well. Because
similar outcomes have become all too common, both
scholars and courts now urge restraint on theories that
enlarge and “weaponize” mootness arguments. There is
substantial concern over the abuse of theories of mootness—be it statutory or equitable. Justice Alito, then
sitting on the Third Circuit, noted that equitable mootness unduly restricts appellate review and “places too
10

See, e.g., Moody’s Sustainable Net Cash Flow, supra.

6
much power in the hands of bankruptcy judges.”11 The
same problem is evident here—where a purported
statutory mootness provision is engrafted onto a Code
section which has no such provision, and then is interpreted broadly as jurisdictional. The harm is evident:
an erroneous ruling by a non-article III court is then
asserted to be immune from appellate review. This
problem is exacerbated by the similar extension of
finding many transactions to be either § 363 “transfers” or somehow “integral” to a § 363 transfer—all in
the name of invoking appellate immunity.
We urge this Court not to permit an unwarranted
expansion of the concept of mootness, be it statutory or
otherwise.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The assignment of the lease between MOAC and
Sears involved a series of separate and discrete steps.
Sears initially entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement (the “APA”) on January 17, 2019, in which it
agreed to sell substantially all its assets to Transform—an entity consisting of former Sears’ executives.

11

See, e.g., Nordhoff Investments v. Zenith Electronics, 258
F.3d 180, 192 (3d Cir 2001) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that “equitable mootness doctrines can easily be used as a weapon to prevent any appellate review of Bankruptcy Court order confirming
reorganization plans.”). See also In re Continental Airlines, 91
F.3d 553, 567-83 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting).

7
App. 103a. The APA was approved in a Sale Order.12
One of the assets was the right to designate, at a future
time, and in a separate legal proceeding, the assignees
of Sears’ leases (the “Designation Rights”). Neither the
APA nor the Sale Order made any mention of any specific lease assignment.
Months later, pursuant to its Designation Rights,
Transform proposed to assign the Sears’ lease to
Leaseco.13 MOAC objected because the proposed assignment failed to meet the statutory requirements for
“adequate assurance of future performance.” One concern was that the proposed assignment did not identify
the actual proposed occupant.14 This put the tenant
mix at risk—an issue noted during congressional testimony as being one of the most critical issues affecting
12

“By order dated February 8, 2019 (the “Sale Order”) the
Bankruptcy Court authorized a sale under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b).
Through the Sale Order, Transform . . . purchased from Sears the
right to designate which assignee would assume Sears’s leases.”
App. 3a-4a.
13
The District Court referred to Respondent Transform
Holdco LLC as “Holdco,” and Transform Leaseco LLC, a wholly
owned subsidiary of Holdco, as “Leaseco,” stating it was Leaseco
which was the designated assignee of the Sears’ lease. App. 12a.
14
“Holdco had no intention of operating a Sears’s store at the
Mall of America, but rather intended to sublease the premises to
a third-party at a profit to Transform. . . . This was MOAC’s major
motivation for fighting the assignment—it did not want to see
Sears’ anchor tenant space divided or occupied by whoever would
pay Transform the highest price. MOAC wanted another big box
retailer to take over the space . . . both to preserve the character
of the Mall of America and to ward off the possibility that MOAC
might find itself in default on co-tenancy provisions in the leases
of other Mall tenants.” App. 19a.

8
the viability of shopping centers when a tenant files for
bankruptcy.15
On September 5, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court entered the “Assignment Order” which authorized Transform to assign the lease to Leaseco. App. 101a-125a.
The Assignment Order specifically recited that the
assignment was governed by § 365.16 Indeed, an assignment of a lease in a shopping center cannot be authorized by § 363, nor is § 363 a necessary component
of a lease assignment.
The District Court initially reversed the Bankruptcy
Court and held that Transform had failed to satisfy the
statutory requirements found in § 365(b)(3)(A). App.
89a et seq. It was not a close call. The Code requires
that the proposed assignee must prove that its financial condition is similar to that of the debtor/tenant “at
the time the debtor became the lessee under the lease.”
§ 365(b)(3)(A). App. 90a. “The statutory language requires similarity of financial condition and operating
performance; the Bankruptcy Court found no such similarity; game over.” App. 91a. The District Court held
15

Pamela S. Holleman and Magdalena Ellis, Reexamining
the Protections Afforded to Solvent Shopping Center Tenants
Under 365 in Light of Trak Auto Corp., Part II, ABI Journal, 6-7
(Feb. 2005) (citing Bankruptcy: the Shopping Center Protection
Improvement Act of 1982: Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Courts of the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate,
S. 2297 at 27-28 (1982).
16
“The Debtors are hereby authorized in accordance with
sections 105(a) and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code to assume and
assign the Designated Lease to the Buyer or the Buyer’s assignee. . . .” App. 114a.

9
that the Bankruptcy Court had, in essence, rewritten
the Code.17 That is, MOAC was not being provided with
adequate assurance of future performance.
On rehearing, the District Court dismissed the appeal. The District Court did not alter its finding that
the assignment violated § 365(b). The statutory defect
with the proposed assignment was never corrected.
The District Court acknowledged that in general, lease
assignments are not governed by § 363(m). (“That said,
not every assignment under § 365 is per se a § 363(m)
sale.’’) App. 41a.
However, the District Court held that because the
assignment was “integral” to the Sale Order then the
mootness provision of § 363(m) attached to § 365(b),
thus denying appellate review of an otherwise invalid
and harmful lease assignment.
Notably, the District Court stated, “this court is
appalled by Transform’s behavior” (App. 28a) because
Transform had repeatedly told the Bankruptcy Court
that § 363(m) did not apply. App. 22a. Nor did the
Bankruptcy Court believe § 363(m) applied. App. 22a.
But because the District Court felt constrained by the
notion that § 363(m) was “jurisdictional,” it stated that
the principles of waiver and estoppel could not be
17

“Instead, the court adopted an alternative standard for determining the adequacy of assurance after concluding that the
statutory standard was not met. Put otherwise, the Bankruptcy
Court, stretching In re Ames past its breaking point, effectively
rewriting it and overriding the express wishes of the legislature.”
App. 95a (citation omitted).

10
considered. App. 27a, announcing the reversal with
“deep regret.” App. 48a.
The Second Circuit affirmed and incorrectly held
that “in the absence of a stay, § 363 limits appellate review of a final sale to “challenges to the ‘good faith’ aspects of the sale, without regard to the merits of the
appeal.” App. 5a (emphasis added; citations omitted).
The core determination, and the “game changer” was
that “section 363(m) is jurisdictional because it ‘creates
a rule of statutory mootness.’” App. 9a. This ruling that
§ 363(m) is jurisdictional improperly precluded the
Second Circuit from considering any possible effective
relief, including the waiver and estoppel by Transform
for first informing the Bankruptcy Court it would not
assert that § 363(m) applied, and then changing its position—which led the District Court to conclude it was
“appalled” at the reversal of position by Transform.
The effect of this ruling is that the owners of commercial real property may have valuable leases assigned to new tenants in violation of the requirements
set by Congress in § 365(b) and yet will be unable to
obtain appellate review by an Article III court. Further,
the ruling adds an unwelcome contribution to the
growing concern over the misuse and abuse of theories
of mootness, both in connection with plans of reorganization (equitable mootness) and in sales (statutory
mootness) both of which have led leading commentators and courts to conclude that the absence of appellate review has led to a “lawless” Chapter 11 process,

11
and one lacking in effective appellate review of the
Bankruptcy Courts.18
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The decision of the Second Circuit should be reversed for the following reasons, in addition to those
urged by Petitioner.
First, the Second Circuit erred by ruling that the
mootness provision found in § 363(m) barred appellate
review. The core ruling was that § 363(m) should be
appended to § 365(b), thereby importing a mootness
provision into the statutory scheme for adequate assurances of future performance. Section 365(b) contains a detailed and precise scheme for assignment of
leases, with the principal obligation being that the
debtor and assignee must provide adequate assurance
of future performance to the lessor. Section 365 is the
exclusive provision that governs. The Second Circuit’s
reasoning rests on federal common-lawmaking that
did not survive Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938).
The ruling by the Second Circuit will be harmful
in virtually all major retail bankruptcy cases involving
shopping centers, Appending a limit of appellate review to § 365(b) will severely diminish the intended
statutory protections afforded to mall owners. The
18

Lynn LoPucki, Chapter 11’s Descent into Lawlessness, 96
Amer. Bankr. L. J. 247 (2022).
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outcome will be that rather than restricting harmful
lease assignments, the decision will permit assignments that are contrary to the law by blocking effective
appellate review.
Second, even if § 363(m) somehow applies, the
courts have held that the purported limit on appellate
review is not jurisdictional but rather is only a limit on
the kind of relief that may be available. “[S]o long as
we can ‘grant effective relief ’ § 363(m) doesn’t bar appellate relief.” ICL Holding Co. Inc., 802 F.3d 547 (3d
Cir. 2015). Numerous cases support the view that “partial relief ” may be granted. The decisions holding that
some “effective relief ” may be considered cannot be
reconciled with the notion that § 363(m) should be
viewed as jurisdictional or as a per se rule precluding
any consideration of any defense.
The Second Circuit disregarded any consideration
on whether effective relief was available and held instead that the § 363(m) contains a per se rule that precludes judicial review in the absence of a stay and on
any issue other than the good faith of the purchaser.19
Yet, because § 363(m) should not be considered “jurisdictional,” the District Court, at a minimum should
have determined whether the defenses of waiver and
estoppel precluded Transform’s argument of mootness.
(“All the conditions for application of judicial estoppel
19

Petitioner is not asking this Court to make a “fact bound”
determination on whether waiver or estoppel was established as
a factual matter, but only that it constituted reversible error for
its failure to consider whether waiver and estoppel survived if
§ 363(m) is viewed as non-jurisdictional.

13
would seem to be met here.”) App. 32a. The Second Circuit acknowledged that the ruling on jurisdiction precluded consideration of the waiver and estoppel issue.
App. 9a.
Third, enlarging the reach of statutory mootness
carries with it the same harms that many courts have
now noted with equitable mootness. “By excising appellate review, equitable mootness tends to insulate
errors by bankruptcy judges or district courts, but also
stunts the development of uniformity in the law of
bankruptcy.” In re One2One Communications, LLC,
805 F.3d 428, 447 (2015) (Krause, J., concurring).20
In a similar vein, Justice Alito, then sitting on the
Third Circuit, noted that mootness unduly restricts
appellate review and “places too much power in the
hands of bankruptcy judges.”21 As a result of this,
Chapter 11 suffers from what Professor Adam Levitin
refers to as “illusory appellate review.”22 “[T]he limited
nature of appellate review in bankruptcy “reduces

20

See also id. at 448, n. 16 (citing Brief of Bankruptcy Law
Professors filed in Law Debenture Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Charter
Commc’ns Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2021 (2013)).
21
See, e.g., Nordhoff Investments v. Zenith Electronics, 258
F.3d 180, 192 (3d Cir 2001) (Alito, J., concurring). See also Continental, 91 F.3d 567-83 (Alito, J., dissenting).
22
Adam J. Levitin, Purdue’s Poison Pill: The Breakdown of
Chapter 11’s Checks and Balances, 100 Tex. L. Rev. 1079 (2022).

14
public oversight in Chapter 11 and intensifies the authority of Bankruptcy Courts.”23
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

LEGAL ARGUMENT
I.

Section 365 is the exclusive statutory
section that governs the assumption and
assignment of commercial leases; § 365
contains no statutory mootness provision.
A. The Second Circuit improperly appended
the mootness provisions of § 363(m) to
§ 365.

The overarching error of the Second Circuit was
its legal conclusion that the mootness provisions found
in § 363(m) can somehow be appended to § 365(b), despite the absence of any textual support in § 365 that
would support such a conclusion. Section 365 is the exclusive section that governs the assumption and assignment of commercial leases. No other Code section
can authorize such a transaction, and no other Code
section is a necessary predicate for consummating
such a transaction.
That the mootness provision of § 363(m) cannot
be properly appended to § 365 was addressed in In re
Joshua Slocum, Ltd., 922 F.3d 1081, 1085 (3d Cir.
1990). “We decline to interpret the mootness principles
23

Levitin, Poison Pill at 1122 (citing Melissa B. Jacoby,
Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1715, 1733
(2018)).
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in such a way that would, in effect create a third situation where parties are required to seek a stay, i.e., the
assignment of leases under § 365. While § 363(m) contains a provision requiring a stay, the section that applies in this case, § 365 does not.” Then Judge Alito, in
dissenting, cited Slocum with apparent approval for
this very proposition that there should not be a “third
situation,” and arguing against the extension of equitable mootness. In re Continental, 91 F.3d 553, 572,
n. 7.
Circuit Judge Sloviter, in his dissent in Slocum
acknowledged that § 363(m) should not be “stretch[ed]
. . . so far” as to embrace § 365. 922 F.3d at 1093. Likewise, the District Court acknowledged that § 363(m)
does not apply to 365(b) in the general case of an assignment only. “That said, not every assignment under
§ 365 is per se a § 363(m) sale.’’ App. 41a.
The recognition that not every assignment is governed by § 363(m) reveals a fatal flaw with the ruling
by the Second Circuit. This statement correctly reflects
that had Sears assigned the lease to Transform as a
one-off matter, and if the assignment were legally defective, as in this case, then an appeal would not be
moot. Merely because Sears first “sold” or assigned the
right to Transform to step into its shoes as assignor of
the lease, does not mean that the assignee had greater
rights than Sears would have had as assignor. If a
single assignment by Sears was subject to appellate
review, then so too was the same assignment when
triggered under the Designation Rights. Transform
did not gain appellate immunity because of the
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intervening step of buying designation rights. Or restated, the procedural mechanism of using “designation
rights” should not alter the substantive requirements
of § 365(b) nor diminish their effect by precluding Article III review.
The same error is evident in the often-repeated
notion that § 363(m) is controlling because it was “integral” or “intertwined” with the earlier Sale Order.
App. 41a-43a. That the assignment was preceded by
the creation of a sale of designation rights should
change nothing in terms of the obligation to comply
with § 365(b)’s requirements, and the ability to appeal
from erroneous decisions. The entire notion that an
“integral” assignment has a different outcome from
an assignment done without a prior designation is an
improper overreach by the Bankruptcy Courts and an
improper exercise of federal common law making, all
of which is precluded under Erie v. Tompkins. See
also In re PW, LLC, 391 B.R. 25, 36-37 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2008). “DB cannot mask an improper condition of the
transfer—avoiding appellate review—by cloaking it as
an essential and inseparable part of a sale.”
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B. Congress enacted detailed and specific
protections for the owners of shopping
centers in § 365(b); adding a judgemade limit on appellate review of invalid assignments would substantially dilute these protections.
Section 365(b) is the exclusive section that governs lease assignments. It operates independently of
§ 363(m) and contains no jurisdictional limit on appellate review—because Congress did not intend for the
protections to be immune to judicial review. Engrafting
a mootness provision through judicial fiat would cause
substantial harm to the express goals of Congress.
In 1984 Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code
adding the Shopping Center Amendments to the
Code to address a perceived problem with the harm
caused by a bankrupt tenant in a large shopping center. To correct the various problems, Congress created
a specialized treatment for leases of commercial shopping centers that distinguish such leases from the generic lease referred in § 363(b). The key protections
were designed to give landlords of shopping centers
greater protection when debtor-tenants sought to assign a lease to third parties.
However, BAPCPA amended § 365(f )(1) and
the courts now seem inclined to prohibit assignments that do not strictly comply with the
lease. . . . This provision was added because
Congress recognized that unlike the usual situation where a lease assignment affects only
the lessor, an assignment of a shopping center
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lease to an outside party can have a significant detrimental impact on others, in particular the center’s other tenants.”24
Congress focused on tenant mix—the risk that a
bankrupt tenant would seek to assign its lease to an
occupant that would destroy the carefully balanced
mix of tenants and thus imperil the financial viability
of owner and other tenants. The legislative history
leading to the enactment of the 1984 Amendments described the “serious economic harm” or risk of business
failure to the other tenants, caused when a tenant files
for bankruptcy:
[T]hese provisions . . . have not functioned as
originally intended by Congress. Under the
Bankruptcy Code, the shopping center and its
solvent tenants may suffer serious economic
harm or even business failure if the bankrupt
tenant closes its store for an extended period
of time or assigns its lease to a business which
does not conform to the lease’s use clause
thus disrupting the shopping center’s tenant
mix.25

24

DAVID KUNEY, RETAIL AND OFFICE BANKRUPTCY 73 (ABI,
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“Congress has determined that shopping center
landlords and non-debtor tenants are entitled to special protections.”26 One of the most critical protections
is that of tenant mix—which was one of two key objections in this case (the other being financial condition).27
“The Code does not allow for the disruption of the existing tenant mix and balance in a shopping center or
the violation of tenant exclusives that would follow a
proposed lease assignment.”28
Testimony taken in connection with the Shopping
Center Amendments focused on the importance of preserving tenant mix:
Tenants locate in shopping centers based on
the complimentary ability of the various
stores in the shopping center to draw customers. . . . These multifarious symbiotic relationships in the shopping center are in peril
whenever any tenant suffers financial hardship or fails. . . . The continued vitality of
those relationships and the businesses in the
center depends on the system our bankruptcy
policies create to swiftly fill vacancies and
fairly acknowledge the interest of remaining
solvent tenants.29
26

Holleman, Protections for Shopping Centers, 1.
Holleman, Protections for Shopping Centers, 3 (discussing
how a shopping center is “akin to a small town” and that a change
in tenant mix is highly disruptive).
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Id. at 4.
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98-65 at 33-35 (1983) (quoting hearings on S. 2297 before the
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Another key witness during the senate hearings,
testified that “the success of a shopping center, and
thus all of its tenants, is based in large part on its tenant mix.”30 “[T]he use of any tenant space for purposes
other than those contemplated by the shopping center
and its other tenants and provided for in a master
lease or other agreement . . . [could cause] a shopping
center’s operations to be seriously impaired.”31
The decision by the Second Circuit that errant assignments cannot be redressed by appellate review is
entirely contrary to the intent of Congress. These detailed protections would be of little value if owners had
no ability to appeal from an erroneous determination
by a Bankruptcy Court. Congress provided for special
protections for owners of shopping centers; engrafting
a mootness provision into this scheme distorts the intent of Congress and too readily permits an outcome as
occurred here—where a plain violation of § 365(b) was
immunized from any appellate review.

Subcommittee on Courts of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 97th
Cong. 2d Sess. (1982) (Testimony by Nathan B. Feinstein)).
30
Id. at 7.
31
Bankruptcy: the Shopping Center Protection Improvement
Act of 1982: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts of the
Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, S. 2297, at 27-28
(1982) (Statement of Wallace R. Woodbury).
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C. The specific provisions of § 365 control over any conflicting provisions in
§ 363(m).
The detailed and specific provisions of § 365(b)
govern over the generalized provision of § 363(m). This
Court’s decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639 (2012) well illustrates why
the specific protections found in § 365(b) should not be
diluted by imposing a generic rule of mootness from
§ 363(m).
In RadLAX the debtors proposed a plan of reorganization which involved the sale of the Radison
Hotel. The Code requires that if a plan of reorganization involves a sale of property subject to a mortgage,
then the lender is entitled to “credit bid” its outstanding loan balance. See § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). Nevertheless,
the debtor’s plan proposed to sell the hotel without permitting the mortgage lender to credit bid, in the hopes
that it could raise cash.
The debtor argued that one of the permitted alternatives to § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) was a plan that provided
for the “realization by such holder of the indubitable
equivalent of its claims.” The debtor argued that despite the precise requirement that credit bidding was
permitted, it could eliminate that right by relying on
the more generalized “indubitable equivalent” provision.
This Court in RadLAX held that the specific provision which permitted credit bidding governed: that
is, the specific statutory section prevails over the
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general especially when, as here, Congress has a comprehensive statutory scheme targeted to a specific
problem:
A well established canon of statutory interpretation succinctly captures the problem: “[I]t
is a commonplace of statutory construction
that the specific governs the general.” That is
particularly true where, as in § 1129(b)(2)(A),
“Congress has enacted a comprehensive scheme
and has deliberately targeted specific problems with specific solutions.”
RadLAX, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (citations omitted).
A similar problem arose in construing the relationship between § 365(f ) and § 365(b)(3)(C). Trak Auto
Corp. v. West Town Center LLC (In re Trak Auto Corp.),
367 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2004). In Trak Auto the question arose over the facial conflict between § 365(f )(1)
which is a general provision that permits lease assignments notwithstanding an anti-assignment clause,
and § 365(b)(3)(C) which is a more specific provision
that requires the assignee of a shopping center to
honor a clause restricting the use of the premises. The
Fourth Circuit held that the specific clause governed
over the general for reasons that pertain here as well.
When two provisions in a statute are in conflict “a specific [provision] closely applicable to
the substance of the controversy at hand controls over a more generalized provision. . . .
Under this canon, § 365(b)(3)(C) controls because it speaks more directly to the issue,
that is, whether a debtor-tenant assigning a
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shopping center lease must honor a straightforward use restriction.
Trak Auto, 367 F.3d 237, at 243-44.
The concern here is similar to RadLAX and Trak
Auto. Section 363(b) refers to a “sale or lease” of estate
property. This is a generic provision that covers a multitude of leases—including personal property. However,
Congress carved out special and exclusive requirements for both leases of “non-residential real property”
and leases of “shopping centers.” The focus of Congress
led to the enactment of specific protections for landlords, and without any limit on appellate review. The
specific and detailed provisions of § 365 should prevail
over the general notion that some sales or leases
might, in other circumstances, be subject to the limits
found in § 363(m).
II.

Even if § 363(m) somehow applies, it is not
a “jurisdictional” barrier to granting effective or partial relief.
A. Section 363(m) only limits the remedies
a court may impose but is not “jurisdictional.”

The Second Circuit’s core ruling was that § 363(m)
is “jurisdictional” because it supposedly contains a “per
se” rule of mootness, which precludes appellate review
regardless of the merits of the appeal and regardless
of whether effective relief of some kind can be fashioned. “We have held in no ambiguous terms that
§ 363(m) is a limit on our jurisdiction and that, absent
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an entry of a stay of the Sale Order, we only retain authority to review challenges to the ‘good faith’ aspect of
the sale.” App. 8a. As noted, this rule pertains “without
regard to the merits of the appeal.” App. 5a.
The Second Circuit’s ruling was incorrect. It deviated both from the plain text of § 363(m) and was
inconsistent with the long-standing principles of mootness that holds that a court must consider whether
there is any “effective relief,” and that partial relief
should be considered. These principles cannot be reconciled with the Second Circuit view that § 363(m) is
an ironclad per se rule that closes the door on the consideration of any issue.
The test for mootness varies with the nature of the
mootness assertion. The Eleventh Circuit in Reynolds
v. Serisfirst Bank (In re Stanford), 17 F.4th 116, 122
(11th Cir. 2021) distinguished three different concepts
of mootness: constitutional, equitable and statutory.
Constitutional mootness is based on the requirement
of a “case or controversy” in Article III and is “jurisdictional.” Id. No one has argued that this appeal was
constitutionally moot. Equitable mootness is based on
reliance or complexity. (“Constitutional mootness is
characterized by an “inability to alter the outcome. By
contrast, equitable mootness involves an “unwillingness to alter the outcome.”)32 Statutory mootness is
distinct and is not jurisdictional. “Statutory mootness
32

George W. Kuney, Understanding and Taming the Doctrine of Equitable Mootness, Norton Annual Survey of Bankruptcy
Law, 2018 edition, at 7.
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under 363(m), however, is not jurisdictional. . . .” Stanford, 17 F.4th at 122.
The underlying rationale for mootness, including
statutory, is whether there is a possibility of “effectual
relief whatever.” That is, can partial relief be meaningful. This has been the law since Mills v. Green, 159 U.S.
651, 653 (1895).
The duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies
by a judgment which can be carried into effect,
and not to give opinions upon moot questions
or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it. It necessarily follows that when, pending an appeal
from the judgment of a lower court, and without any fault of the defendant, an event occurs
which renders it impossible for this court, if it
should decide the case in favor of the plaintiff,
to grant him any effectual relief whatever, the
court will not proceed to a formal judgment,
but will dismiss the appeal.
As Justice Roberts wrote for a unanimous Court
in Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) “a case
becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to
grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing
party. . . . As long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the
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case is not moot.” (Citing Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651,
653.)33
These principles of mootness are reflected in the
statutory mootness provisions in the Bankruptcy Code.
Prior to the enactment of the 1978 Code, the bankruptcy mootness provision was found in former Rule
805 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
(abrogated by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978).
Bankruptcy Rule 805, was the “precursor to Section
363(m).”34 Like § 363(m), Rule 805 does not reflect a jurisdictional limit but speaks of a possible reversal or
modification on appeal:
Former Bankruptcy Rule 805 provided in pertinent part: “Unless an order approving a sale
of property . . . is stayed pending appeal, the
sale to a good faith purchaser . . . shall not be
affected by the reversal or modification of
such order on appeal, whether or not the purchaser . . . knows of the pendency of the appeal.” This provision was dropped with the
adoption of Rule 8005 (Rule 805’s replacement) in 1983, but the doctrine continues both
as a creature of common law and in the provisions of sections 363(m) and 364(e) of the
Bankruptcy Code.

33

“While a court may not be able to return the parties to the
status quo ante—a court can fashion some form of meaningful
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Edith H. Jones, Bankruptcy Appeals, 16 T. Marshall L.
Rev. 245, 266 (1991).35
Section 363(m) varies slightly but significantly
from former Rule 805. It now states that the “reversal
or modification” “does not affect the validity of the sale
or lease under such authorization.” Thus, the change
was from “shall not be affected” to “does not affect the
validity of the sale.” If anything, this change gave
greater latitude to an appeal since the issue is not
whether the appeal “affects” the sale but more narrowly whether it affects the “validity of the sale.”
Accordingly, the District Court and Second Circuit
were obligated to consider whether some effective relief was available—including consideration of whether
waiver and estoppel precluded any assertion of mootness, or whether the challenge to the lease assignment
had any material effect on the Sale Order—which
made no mention of any specific assignment.
B. Section 363(m) does not preclude appellate review of whether partial relief
is available.
Petitioner correctly argues that several of the circuit courts have rejected the argument that § 363(m)
is a jurisdictional bar to appellate review. Cert. Pet. 17
(citing cases). For example, in In re Energy Future
Holdings Corp., 949 F.3d 806 (3d Cir. 2020) the Third
35
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Circuit held that “mootness” is “a bit of a misnomer because we have construed § 363(m) as a constraint not
on our jurisdiction but on our capacity to afford relief.”
949 F.3d at 820. It held that the “ultimate test is
whether the grant of relief would in effect ‘claw back
the sale.’ ” 949 F.3d at 821 (citing ICL Holding, 802 F.3d
at 554).
Courts have permitted appellate relief where
there could be effective relief even if remedy was only
partial. “Furthermore, appellate courts have not hesitated to find Bankruptcy Court orders only partially
moot.”36 See also In re Edwards, 962 F.2d 641 (7th Cir.
1992) (concluding that § 363(m) does not, however, forbid all forms of collateral attack).
This recognition that partial relief can be granted
undercuts the notion that § 363(m) is jurisdictional. In
other words, the part of the order that can be dealt
with effectively will not be found moot.37 Examples of
36
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partial appellate relief included confirmed plans of reorganization that have been partially performed or
payment of money, such as attorney fees.38 These cases
of partial relief confirm that § 363(m) is not jurisdictional; that the appellate court may still seek to fashion some relief.
The Second Circuit, however, expressly declined
to consider the availability of partial relief. It cited
Contrarian Funds LLC v. Artex LLC (In re WestPoint
Stevens, Inc.), 600 F.3d 231, 247 (2d Cir. 2010) for the
proposition that § 363(m) “moots a broader range of
cases than are barred under traditional doctrines of
mootness. Even if the appeal is not moot as a constitutional matter because a court could provide a remedy
. . . § 363(m) requires that certain appeals nonetheless
be treated as moot absent a stay.” 600 F.3d at 247 (citations omitted).
The Second Circuit’s statement that it could not
consider partial relief was a greater barrier to appellate review than the standard for constitutional mootness. This extreme view would mean that Congress
intended to preclude appellate relief on a larger scale
than traditional principles of mootness, and yet failed
to use language plainly signifying such a critical aspect
of the Code.

1986); In re King Resources Co., 651 F.2d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir.
1981); In re Combined Metals Reduction Co., 557 F.2d 179, 19495 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Effective relief may well have been available. For
example, a finding that § 363(m) was not jurisdictional
would have permitted the District Court to consider
the valid arguments of waiver and estoppel. Transform
had repeatedly advised the Bankruptcy Court it was
not relying on § 363(m) and based on that, Judge Drain
denied a request for a stay based on these representations. App. 32a. The District Court was “appalled” at
this conduct. App. 28a. but felt its hands were tied.
Also, reversing the designation of Leaseco as a
lease assignee would not have altered one word of the
APA or the Sale Order—neither of which were based
on an assignment to Leaseco. Thus, reversal of the assignment would not have “clawed back” the core consideration of the Sale Order.39
C. Section 363(m) did not preclude appellate review of whether the assignment
of Sears’ lease was “authorized.”
Section 363(m) only pertains if there has been an
“authorization under subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property. . . .” Thus, a threshold
test for the triggering of mootness is whether the sale
was one “authorized” under § 363(b) or § 363(c). Some
courts have interpreted this to mean that if the sale
order is violative of the Bankruptcy Code, then it

39
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cannot be found to constitute a valid “authorization.”
Other courts disagree.40
The leading case is Matter of Saybrook Mfg. Co.,
Inc., 963 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11th Cir. 1992). The Eleventh
Circuit held that an appeal from a financing order
which permitted cross-collateralization was not moot
because cross-collateralization violated the Code.
“Cross-collateralization is not authorized by section
364. Section 364(e), therefore, is not applicable and this
appeal is not moot.”
The principles underlying Saybrook pertain here,
as acknowledged in the concurring opinion of Circuit
Judge Joran in In re Stanford, 17 F.4th 116 (11th Cir.
2021). Judge Jordan doubted whether “any sale which
is authorized by a Bankruptcy Court, regardless of
whether the underlying transaction violates the Bankruptcy Code, triggers statutory mootness.” Id. at 126.
He stated that under Saybrook § 364(m) “does not bar
an appeal of a Bankruptcy Court’s authorization of a
financing order if the claim is that the Bankruptcy
Code does not permit the type of financing that has
been authorized. We expressly rejected the ‘cart before
the horse’ approach embraced by other courts which,
absent a stay, mooted all claims irrespective of whether

40

But cf. Reynolds v. Servisfirst Ban (In re Stanford), 17
F.4th 116, 122-23 stating that “ ‘authorizations’ are covered, not
just those that may be proper under the Code.” This view effectively negates the meaning of “authorization” and thus renders
the word “authorized” as without any useful content.

32
or not the Code prohibited the underlying financing
mechanism.” 17 F.4th at 127.
In the case below, the District Court had already
determined that the lease assignment violated § 365(b).
The Assignment Order did not, and could not, deviate
from the Code and permit assignments that violated a
key Code provision. The Assignment Order cannot be
fairly read as “authorizing” transfers in contravention
of § 365. Thus, because the assignment was not an “authorized” transaction, the mootness provision of § 363(m)
was not triggered.
III. The mootness provision of § 363(m) should
not be expanded to embrace lease assignments under § 365.
Mootness has become an endemic issue in bankruptcy practice. As Justice Alito noted, mootness has
been “weaponized” to preclude effective appellate review of plans of reorganization (equitable mootness)
and has, to the same effect, been asserted to avoid appellate review of “sales” under § 363(m). What ties
these two problems together is the equally well noted
problem that bankruptcy practice has migrated from
a “plan oriented” practice to one dominated by a
“sales” process—in which virtually all dispositions
are deemed sales, with the attendant assertion of
“mootness.” The net result in both cases is the same—
bankruptcy law is developing with a notable lack of
uniformity and without any Article III review despite
the evident need for such.
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One of the leading scholars on modern bankruptcy
practice, Professor Lynn M. LoPucki has written extensively on the “lawlessness” in modern Chapter 11
cases—a change which he argues has occurred in part
because of the misuse of § 363 and the absence of effective appellate review of the Bankruptcy Courts. Lynn
M. LoPucki, Chapter 11’s Descent into Lawlessness, 96
Amer. Bankr. L. J. 247 (2022).
The harm from the overuse of § 363 has led to the
absence of effective appellate review. Professor Adam
Levitin has analyzed the problem of “illusory appellate
review” in Chapter 11 cases.
Appellate rights, however, are often illusory in
bankruptcy. As Professor Melissa Jacoby has
noted, the limited nature of appellate review
in bankruptcy “reduces public oversight in
Chapter 11 and intensifies the authority of
Bankruptcy Courts.41
Professor Levitin concludes that in general “bankruptcy suffers from a lack of effective appellate review for a variety of reasons because no part of the
system is designed to be conducive to appellate review.”42 The lack of appellate review ultimately empowers Bankruptcy Courts to disregard the law, which
in turn encourages debtors to engage in judge and
venue shopping: “lack of appellate review becomes a
41
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decidedly pro-debtor feature upsetting bankruptcy
law’s careful calibration of debtor and creditor rights.”43
The proper ruling on the narrow scope of § 363(m)
relates to the broader issue underlying this appeal—
namely, the need for adequate appellate review of
Bankruptcy Courts decisions, and the related need to
limit rulings that immunize Bankruptcy Courts from
appellate review. Here, The Second Circuit’s decision
will continue the erosion of effective appellate review
and may thus contribute to what academic scholars
now see as lawlessness in Chapter 11.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

CONCLUSION
Your amici respectfully submit that the Second
Circuit decision should be reversed.
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